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Abstract
Automatic Speaker Recognition has a potential to be used
in Forensic Speaker Comparison. For the latter, foren-
sic scientists agree that presentation of the comparison
to court should be in terms of a calibrated likelihood ra-
tio. In recent years the field of automatic speaker recog-
nition has made significant progress in the analysis, eval-
uation and calibration of likelihood ratios. In this paper
we investigate if speaker comparison by humans can be
carried out using the same framework. For this, we use
the US National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) Speaker Recognition Evaluation 2010 material to
measure the performance and calibrate the speaker com-
parison opinions of human subjects. Because empirical
calibration needs a large collection of trials and a human
judgment takes a substantial effort, the analysis is car-
ried out for a collection of 40 subjects. From NIST SRE
2010 a subset of 1280 speaker comparison trials are se-
lected. The selection is made using the scores from a
state-of-the-art speaker recognition system, such that 1)
the trials are representative of the overall performance,
in terms of difficulty of the comparisons for the auto-
matic system, and 2) they can be analyzed in three distinct
classes ‘hard,’ ‘representative’ and ‘easy.’ Results show
that this classification extends to the performance of the
human collective, with an Equal Error Rate of 45 %, 25 %
and 13 % respectively. Further, the overall human results
can be calibrated using ROC convex hull analysis to show
a nice linear relation between the 10-level similarity re-
sponse and a log-likelihood-ratio scale.
1. Introduction
With the performance of automatic speaker recognition
systems steadily increasing, in part driven by evaluation
campaigns such as the NIST Speaker Recognition Eval-
uations and the various JHU and BOSARIS workshops,
and commercial systems becoming readily available, the
use of automatic speaker recognition systems for foren-
sic speaker comparison purposes becomes viable. In both
automatic speaker recognition and forensic speaker com-
parison, the task is to compute the likelihood ratio that,
given two speech segments, these originate from the same
speaker or from different speakers. In formula form, the
likelihood ratio r is
r =
P (speech segments | Hp)
P (speech segments | Hd) , (1)
where Hp,d are the prosecutor’s and defense hypothe-
ses, stating that the speech segments are produced by the
same, or different, speakers, respectively. In automatic
speaker recognition, the likelihood ratio can be used to
make an optimal Bayes’ decision given a cost function
and a prior [1], whereas in forensic speaker compari-
son this can be used to express the weight of evidence
in court [2].
In many countries, forensic speaker comparison is
still carried out exclusively by human experts [3, 4], but
in some countries forensic examiners are beginning to use
automatic speaker recognition in certain cases [4, 5]. An
argument, on the one hand, to be reluctant to use auto-
matic systems in a forensic case is that the speech style
and electro-acoustical recording conditions of the trace
(the evidence) is often quite different from the reference
recording in the speaker comparison, and no explicit per-
formance characteristics of the system under those condi-
tions are known. On the other hand, the reports of foren-
sic speaker comparisons are seldom explicit in computa-
tion of the likelihood ratio for acoustic-phonetic or lin-
guistic features that are marked as similar between the
questioned recording and the reference [6].
The methods for computing likelihood ratios in the
automatic speaker recognition domain and in the forensic
speaker comparison domain are quite different. In the for-
mer, the approach is empirical and the raw discriminative
scores of a system are taken as uncalibrated scores, and
using a large collection of supervised trials (same-speaker
and different-speaker comparisons) an empirical score-
to-likelihood-ratio transformation is determined. So far,
one of the most robust and effective score-to-likelihood
ratio functions has been an affine transformation of the
score s
` ≡ log r = as+ b, (2)
effectively scaling the score by a and shifting it with
b such that the resulting log-likelihood-ratio has good,
probabilistically well interpretable, properties. In the
latter, manually or semi-automatically obtained contin-
uous features are directly modeled in same-speaker and
different-speaker distributions [7], or, in the case of dis-
crete features, population frequencies can used to com-
puted the likelihood ratio, similar to how this happens
with DNA. But often, an opinion is formulated where
the similarity between the segments is expressed using a
“verbal scale” [3,4,6,8]. How such a verbal scale maps to
likelihood ratios is, however, a subject of debate. [9, 10]
If we want to get a better insight in how the auto-
matic and the human methods compare we should prob-
ably let one do the task of the other, and see what the
performance is. One way of doing this is by doing a
“human benchmark”: giving a human exactly the same
task as the system, and evaluate the performance in the
same way. For automatic speaker recognition, such an
experiment has been carried out by Schmidt-Nielsen and
Crystal [11], and in the NIST Human Assisted Speaker
Recognition (HASR) evaluations [12–14]. What the ex-
act ‘human method’ is, is not so important for the perfor-
mance evaluation and calibration method set forward in
this paper; it could be a detailed acoustic-phonetic anal-
ysis as performed by forensic experts [3, 4], or holistic
acoustic impressions as carried out in this study and oth-
ers [11, 13, 14].
In this paper, we carry out a similar experiment to
Schmidt-Nielsen in a somewhat different setting, and
with the goal to investigate a method for determining
a score-to-likelihood ratio mapping for human speaker
comparison. This is in a way similar to the approach of
ATVS-UAM to NIST HASR 2010 [13], where this map-
ping was taken a linear function. In this approach we
study the shape of the mapping and the range of the re-
sulting likelihood ratios.
2. Experimental design and details
With humans being limited in the amount of trials they
can perform, we have designed an experiment with sev-
eral goals in mind. The first is that the overall task should
be of the same level of difficulty as the system test of
NIST SRE 2010. Secondly, we want to study if trials that
are hard for a system are also hard for the humans and
vice versa. Finally, we want to find a relationship be-
tween a verbal scale of similarity and the likelihood ratio.
For empirical performance measurement and calibra-
tion we need many trials. Because a single trial takes a
human subject a considerable time to complete—the sub-
ject should at least listen once to the segments—we de-
cided to determine the performance of human subjects as
a whole, effectively integrating out between-subject per-
formance variation. Thus, every subject was exposed to
their own set of trials, and the analysis is typically carried
out over all subjects.
2.1. Trial selection
We used a different trial selection algorithm from what
was used in HASR1 in NIST SRE 2010 [12], where pairs
of similar speakers were sought for non-target trials and
dissimilar target trials using a combination of machine
and human judgments, leading to a set of very hard tri-
als. In order to have a range of difficulties in this exper-
iment we selected the trials as follows. We used speech
material from the NIST 2010 SRE, telephone-telephone
male English condition, a.k.a. ‘det 5’. Our Radboud Uni-
versity Nijmegen (RUN) automatic speaker recognition
system [15] computed scores for all trials, i.e., the en-
tire score matrix of train vs. test segments. Then we
self-calibrated the scores using logistic regression, i.e.,
a linear transformation of the log-likelihood-ratio (LLR)
scores (2) optimizing a cross-entropy objective function
on the test data itself. The log-likelihood-ratio score dis-
tributions after calibration are shown in Fig. 1. We then
selected trials from three regions, corresponding to diffi-
culty classes: 1) around ` = 0: these trials are “hard,”
the recognizer cannot separate targets and non-targets;
2) around the modes in the distribution: these trials are
“representative”; 3) high target and low non-target scores:
these trials can be considered “easy.” These three classes
are indicated as shaded bars in Fig. 1. The total amount
of trials in each class was 160, 960 and 160 respectively.
The trials were further distributed over 40 subjects in
such a way that each subject had 4, 24 and 4 trials from
each class, respectively, with equal amounts of target and
non-target trials per class. This distribution guaranteed
that a) each subject is exposed to approximately the same
level of difficulty, according to the system, b) the target
priors for each subject are the same, c) the overall dif-
ficulty is similar to the complete test. Since bias, the
tendency of some subjects to find speakers more differ-
ent where others may find them more the same, has an
effect on the calibration of the speaker comparison opin-
ion, we stressed that the target priors of the trials were
50 %. This is different from the experiment by Schmidt-
Nielsen, where the priors were only approximately 0.5,
as we did not anticipate subjects to count their own deci-
sions to match the given priors over the 32 trials. For any
subject, trials were presented in random order.
2.2. Experimental interface
We used a similar experimental interface to what we had
used in experiments in human language recognition [16],
that had proved to be quite effective. The interface is
shown in Fig. 2. Every trial is a comparison of two speech
segments, where the task is to determine if the identity
of the speaker is the same or not. For both “same” and
“different”, five levels of confidence could be specified,
named “very uncertain”, “uncertain”, “confident”, “very
confident” and “certain”. This configuration is the same


























Figure 1: The Probability Density Functions (lines) for
target (red) and non-target (blue) scores of the automatic
speaker recognition system for NIST SRE 2010 ‘det-5’
male trials after self-calibration. The bars show the LLR
score regions and relative quantities from which the tri-
als for the human benchmark were drawn, with numbers
indicating the difficulty class.
as in the Schmidt-Nielsen experiment, but the labels have
somewhat different naming. The labels are different from
the ‘verbal scale’ that is sometimes used in forensic evi-
dence reporting [8], not only in wording (“. . . support for
the prosecution hypothesis”) but also in the omission of
an “indecision”’ option corresponding to a likelihood ra-
tio (LR) of 1. Since the subjects were lay people w.r.t.
forensic speaker comparison, we felt the wording in terms
of a posterior probability was more intuitive, and is not
incorrect given the explicit information about the prior.
The subjects were in control of the playback of both seg-
ments, they could switch from one to another, and pause,
at will. In order to maximize exposure to phonemic vari-
ability, playback of a segment would continue where it
had been stopped the previous time. We did not provide
the subjects with further control over the position of play
back. A trial ended when any of the ten response but-
tons along the “certain: same”–“certain: different” scale
was pressed. The interface did not allow for corrections
after decisions. For comparison, in the experiment by
Schmidt-Nielsen [11], a stimulus was presented as a test-
target-test sequence of 3×3 s, paced by the subjects. Tri-
als were presented in blocks of 20 with the same target
speaker, with 2 min. training of the target speaker before
each block. The ten response buttons were ordered left to
right, with extremely certain at the edges and uncertain
in the middle, similar to our vertical lay-out (cf. Fig. 2).
Figure 2: The experimental interface shown to the sub-
jects
2.3. Recruitment of subjects
Because the focus of this study is on the evaluation and
calibration method for human speaker comparison, we
used naı¨ve subjects rather than forensic experts—a much
more scarce resource—in order to obtain more trials, sim-
ilar to [13] and [14]. Forty subjects were recruited from
the student community of the University College Utrecht,
an international liberal arts and sciences establishment.
The language of communication at the college is English,
and most subjects are non-native English speakers but ac-
tively embedded in an English speaking community. Re-
cruitment was carried out through contemporary social
media, and subjects were not paid for their efforts. The
typical session duration was 30–45 minutes, with some
subjects requiring much more time. None of the sub-
jects reported hearing problems, but their hearing abilities
were not explicitly tested.
2.4. Experimental details
Experiments were conducted in a reasonably quiet envi-
ronment. The software was run in a Java virtual machine
in a Linux virtual environment on a laptop PC. Audio was
presented through high quality headphones at a comfort-
able listening level. Longer periods of silence (> 0.5 s)
in the speech had been automatically removed in order
to make the experiment more efficient. The subjects re-
ceived a short introduction about the purpose of the ex-
periment from the experiment leader, and further received
instructions through information panels on the screen.
One of the screens drew special attention to the fact that
in 50 % of the trials the speakers were, in fact, the same.
This message was also always visible during the main
Table 1: Aggregate statistics for the responses, same/different versus response score. Scores are sorted from “certain:
different” to “certain: same.”
trial −4.5 −3.5 −2.5 −1.5 −0.5 0.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5
diff 152 117 152 74 11 14 40 43 18 19
same 36 26 70 56 22 15 78 138 118 81
experiment (cf. Fig. 2). After this information, six other-
wise unused trials were presented as training/habituation.
No feedback towards the decision was given in the habit-
uation period, but the trials were chosen according to the
easiest selection criteria.
After the experiment of 32 trials, subjects received
immediate feedback about their performance in terms of
an Equal Error Rate (EER).
3. Results
3.1. Overall performance
For analysis of the results, the response buttons are repre-
sented as scores, from +4.5 for “certain: same” to −4.5
for “certain: different”. The aggregate response statis-
tics are tabulated in Table 1. The overall results can best
be summarized in a Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC), as in Fig. 3. This is a graph showing the trade
off between the probabilities of false alarms (false posi-
tives, PFA) and misses (false negatives, Pmiss) if a thresh-
old t for forcing decisions would have been ‘between
the response buttons,’ effectively at t = −5,−4, . . . , 5.
The circles correspond to these thresholds, and the line
segments to response buttons. Because we have plotted
the convex hull (CH) of the ROC, which has a special
minimum-cost interpretation [17], some segments actu-
ally correspond to a group of adjacent buttons.
An often reported summary of the overall perfor-
mance is the Equal Error Rate E=, which we define as
the point where PFA = Pmiss on the ROC-CH. For the
overall data E= = 26.5%. We can compute E= for the
different subsets of the data, namely the difficulty classes
1–3 discussed in Section 2.1. From hard to easy, the re-
sults are E= = 44.8%, 25.5%, 13.2%.
We can use the ROC-CH to compute what the op-
timal log-likelihood-ratio score is corresponding to the
buttons, assuming we can treat all subjects as a single
‘system.’ This implicitly assumes that subjects share the
same ‘calibration,’ i.e., that one person means more-or-
less the same with “confident” as the next. The optimal
likelihood that can be associated with the subject’s judg-
ment is just the negative slope of the corresponding ROC-
CH line segment. Optimal in this sense means restricting
the score-to-likelihood function to be a monotonously in-
creasing function. The result of this operation is plotted
in Fig. 4, as the heavy black line.
































Figure 3: The overall performance, as Receiver Operat-



























Figure 4: The optimal score-to-log-likelihood ratio func-
tion for the response of the human subjects (heavy line),
and the LLRs found from ML ratios.
the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates of P (s | Hp)
and P (s | Hd). From Table 1 we would, e.g., find






11 , resulting in a log-likelihood ratio of log 2.
The values of such a computation are shown as the red,
thin line in Fig. 4. It follows our earlier optimal LLR
curve, but is not constrained by monotonicity. This way
of computing LLRs directly from the probability density
functions (PDFs) observed in development data sets [18]
is popular in the forensic science community, but we feel
that it has some undesirable properties. For one thing,
it can associate a higher LR with a lower score, as can
be observed from Fig. 4 at scores near −4, 0 and 4, but
it can also lead to arbitrarily high and fluctuating LRs
if smoothing parameters that are needed to estimate the
PDF for continuous features are chosen badly. The ROC-
CH method is more robust in relation to these issues.
Note that the ROC-CH method gives exactly the same
LLRs as the PAV algorithm [1] does.
3.2. Per-subject calibration
As indicated above, the overall performance is expected
to be a bit pessimistic because mis-calibration between
subjects will lead to worse performance. We can try
to compensate for this by calibrating the individual sub-
ject’s responses using their own performance character-
istic, and then pooling their calibrated scores. As a first,
cheating, experiment, we use all 32 responses per sub-
ject to compute this subjects optimal score-to-likelihood-
ratio mapping. This is very similar to the “likelihood-
ratio” score combination method used in [11] to combine
responses from different listeners,1 although we use the
ROC-CH derived LR (cf. the black line in Fig. 4) and they
use the ML method (red line). In order to limit the magni-
tude of the LLRs, which can easily become±∞ for some
trials, we used ‘Laplace’s rule of succession’ [1], which
effectively adds additional scores of +∞ and −∞ to tar-
get and non-target scores before calibration, to cater for
scores potentially unobserved in training. The resulting
ROC is indicated in Fig. 5 in black, and it shows a much
lower overall E= = 23.0%. This way of calibrating each
subject individually really is “cheating,” because the in-
formation of the true hypothesis is used for each trial, al-
beit in a constrained way. If this monotonicity constraint
were removed, such cheating would lead to LLRs of±∞,
giving rise to no errors.
A better approach to calibrating individual subjects is
to use a cross-validation method. We used the chrono-
logical first half of each subject’s trials to compute an
optimal score-to-LLR transformation, and applied this to
the second half of their scores. In order to obtain the
same number of scores as before we also reversed this
1In [11], this was used to combine responses from subjects for the
same trial, where we do it to pool different trials, but the idea is the
same.

























Figure 5: ROC after calibration of individual subject’s
responses.
operation, i.e., calibrating on the second half and apply-
ing this to the first, resulting in a 2-fold cross-validation
setup. The results of this individual calibration is shown
in red in Fig. 5, which has a lower discrimination perfor-
mance than the cheating experiment shown in black, with
E= = 28.8%. This is not better than the original, uncal-
ibrated, pooled scores, with E= = 26.5%. Apparently,
the 16 scores available per subject are not enough to cal-
ibrate an individual. In [13], a similar effect (individual
vs. pooled) was observed w.r.t calibration performance.
4. Discussion and Analysis
The overall discrimination performance of the human
subjects, evaluated as if the judgments are from a single,
consistent, system for the SRE 2010 data in our exper-
imental conditions can be summarized as E= = 26%.
This may appear very high, at first, but we have to point
out the caveat that these subjects are naı¨ve w.r.t. the task,
and predominantly not native speakers of English. More-
over, the subjects did not use the full content of the speech
files, but made decisions after having listened to part of
the files. We recorded the exact button-press times, so
that we can analyze the average time a subject was ex-
posed to speech. For the overall set, this was 17.7 s
per speech segment, ranging per subject from 8.8–34.2 s.
Only a small correlation effect (−0.4%/s, p = 0.02)
could be found between a per-subject E= and this lis-
tening time. More interesting perhaps is that the average
duration measured over trial difficulty classes (cf. Sec-
tion 2.1) drops as 18.8, 17.8, 15.6 s with decreasing diffi-
culty, showing that the easier trials took less effort.
If we want to compare these results to automatic sys-
Table 2: RUN Automatic Speaker Recognition system
performance as a function of duration of the speech seg-
ments.
duration (s) 5 10 20 40 80
E= (%) 23.3 13.2 6.5 4.4 3.4
tem performance, we have to be very careful. First of
all, system performance increases steadily over time, and
specifically for this data, because researchers improve
their systems using this data as evaluation material. Fur-
ther, systems have access to the full utterances, and hence
use more information per trial, and it is not trivial to
change the experimental set-up to allow human subjects
to utilize the same amount of information. Probably a
set-up with detailed play-back control and spectrographic
tools, much as the forensic speaker comparison examiner
has, would come closer to these goals but require much
more effort on behalf of the subject, making an experi-
ment at this scale (1280 trials) almost impossible. Please
note that the detailed Human Assisted Speaker Recogni-
tion evaluations of NIST SRE 2010 [12] and 2012 only
contained 15 and 20 trials, respectively, and required sub-
stantial effort from participants. With these restrictions
in mind, we can compare the results on the same tri-
als to the RUN system2, which is not the best available
system but probably has not yet been over-tuned to this
data. We used several data sets where the utterances have
been truncated in duration [19]. The discrimination per-
formance results are in Table 2, from which we can con-
clude that the naı¨ve human performs comparably to the
RUN system using about 5 seconds per segment where
the humans use 18 seconds.
Related to the relatively low discrimination perfor-
mance, we find that the range of LLRs is fairly limited,
roughly to a magnitude of 1.5 (cf. Fig. 4), corresponding
to LRs in the range 0.23–5.4. This means that these sub-
ject’s opinion of “certain” (the most extreme confidence
available to them) correspond to LRs of roughly 14 and 5
for this data, which is certainly far away from the ‘verbal
likelihood ratio scales’ as used in the literature, which
can range from 10−4 to 104 [9]. One could argue that
the data or the task simply is too difficult, and that there
is the psychological effect that humans want to use the
entire response scale for answers, and will scale accord-
ingly. However, if we analyze the mean absolute score
for the first and second halves of the trials per subject, we
find the values 2.96 and 2.80 which shows, if anything, an
opposite effect. One can also argue that a small trial set
like this can’t produce any high magnitude LLR anyway,
as by virtue of Laplace’s rule of succession values would
be limited to ∼ log 640 ≈ 6.5, in a case where all tar-
2Using a configuration of the system that was different from the sys-
tem used in trial selection, so that scores for the selected trials are more
evenly distributed than the shaded areas in Fig. 1












Figure 6: The score-to-LLR mapping after per-subject
calibration, cross-validation experiment.
get trials are judged with the same, supportive, response,
with no non-target trials with that response. The magni-
tude of LLRs corresponding to ‘certain’ suffer a bit from
the mis-calibration between subjects. If we remove this
by using the cross-validation calibration results from Sec-
tion 3.2, as is shown in Fig. 6, the range of LRs becomes
a little wider, about 15–7.4. The finding of low magni-
tude LLR is consistent with [13] where calibrated LRs
not exceeding the range 0.1–10 were reported for human
speaker comparison.
Despite the low magnitude LLRs observed in the
original experiment in Fig. 4, it is interesting that the
(raw) score-to-LLR function is fairly linear. No where
in the briefing or the experimental protocol a logarithmic
relation of the levels of certainty was suggested. Perhaps
this is consistent with the interpretation of “weight of ev-
idence,” which, for being an additive quantity function-
ing on a prototypical weighing scale of justice, must be
expressed as log likelihood ratios [20]. In [13], this lin-
ear relation between the response value and the LLR was
taken as an assumption in the calibration function. It ap-
pears we have found support for this assumption in this
work.
The choice of ten response values, similar to [11],
with a forced decision and visually not linear may have
affected the distribution of responses. From Table 1 it
can be seen that response values in the middle of the
range, −0.5 and 0.5 receive less hits, and detailed analy-
sis shows that this is true for all difficulty classes. We can
only understand this as a psychological effect of evad-
ing ‘extreme’ responses, even though these middle val-
ues are not extreme in score value, but only in visual
grouping. Such effects should be taken into account for
subsequent experiments, where we would advice to use a
linear equidistant set of responses with a middle ground,
“undecided” or “LR = 1.” Ramos [13] used a 7-point
confidence scale with indeed a middle value indicating
LR = 1. From Fig. 4, there is evidence that the cor-
rect interpretation of both “very uncertain” responses is
` ≈ 0, and it is probably better to allow explicitly for
such a response.
5. Conclusions
The performance of the “human system,” whether inter-
nally calibrated or not, is not to be taken as representa-
tive for that of manual forensic speaker comparison: here,
we work with lay listeners instead of experts, the expo-
sure to the speech is very limited, the listeners are mostly
non-native in the spoken language, long silences were re-
moved, and the speech material is not taken from actual
cases. However, the method of empirical calibration—as
we are used to in automatic speaker recognition—should
be possible to carry out with forensic experts. A practi-
cal problem, however, is the amount of effort that such
an empirical calibration would take. If experts take, e.g.,
two weeks to form a well-founded opinion for speaker
similarity for a single trial, a calibration at the scale of
this experiment would take many person-years. Even if
such an effort is taken, it is difficult to keep the ‘internal
calibration’ of the expert constant over the entire period.
Finally, the stimulus material must be made up of trials
for which the true hypothesis is known, effectively rul-
ing out real case material that includes the questioned
recording. However, from ‘collateral’ case material it
should be possible to generate trials where the hypothesis
is known with negligible uncertainty. We would advo-
cate that the proposed method of empirically calibrating
opinions should somehow be carried out. Perhaps there
are paradigms feasible in which the average time per trial
is reduced, e.g., by grouping these for the same target
speaker or by structurally including calibration trials in
the standard operating procedure in forensic case work.
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